CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 267

Page 267

SECRET

Page 267

1.

ARMS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

SECRET

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and for Defence (OPD(67) 70) about the

supply to the South African Government of certain items of defence

equipment.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that an early decision was required on

the supply to the South African Government, as and when they were

needed over the next ten years, of a number of items of defence

equipment in a list which they had submitted after the talks in January on the consequences of our naval withdrawal from South

Africa. Apart from one item spares for Centurian tanks, which

it was proposed should be refused in accordance with existing

policy, the items listed were ships, aircraft and other equipment

for maritime defence which they would need in order to maintain the

efficiency of their maritime forces and play their role under the

Sinonstown Agreement. One of these maritime items, electronics and communications equipment, we were already prepared to supply.

But the supply of the remaining items would constitute a change in

our policy on the supply of arms as announced by the Prime Minister

in November 1964, and therefore raised difficult considerations of

policy, both external and internal, and of presentation.

Our policy since November 1964 had been based on compliance with the United Nations (UN) Resolutions of 1963 and 1964 (for two of the three of which we had voted) which called upon UN member States to cease

all arms sales to South Africa. Our compliance with the Resolution

did not mean that we supplied no military equipment whatever to

South Africa: for example, we had agreed to supply unarmed survey

ships, naval spares and ammunition for practice purposes, aircraft

spares and some replacements, and other special items. Nevertheless,

a decision to supply meritime defence equipment of the kinds listed

would expose the Government to considerable criticism at the UN and

in some quarters in this country, notably among the Government's

supporters in Parliament. On the other hand, the effects of

refusing supply were also serious: the value of the listed items was well over £70 million (though actual supply would not take place for some time yet); we should jeopardise further supply of

SECRET

-1-

Page 267